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Abstract: In 2011, the automotive industry 
introduced the application of a standardized process 
for functional safety-related development of 
automotive electronic products. The related 
international standard, ISO 26262 functional safety 
for road vehicles, has high demands on process 
documentation and analysis. Within an engineering 
context this challenges the tremendous increase of 
complexity for modern automotive systems and high 
productivity demands for industrial competiveness 
purpose.  
Model based development techniques based on an 
Architecture Description Language (ADL) has been 
identified as the best candidate to manage the 
system complexity and the related safety analysis 
with the benefit of formal description and capabilities 
for test automation. The proposed concept relies on 
the definition of a compositional error modeling 
approach tightly coupled with the system 
architecture model, capable to analyze the software 
and hardware architectures and implementations.  
This paper explains the results of the language 
extension based on the EAST-ADL and AUTOSAR 
domain model in terms of early safety evaluation of 
an automotive architecture, automating the 
qualitative and quantitative assessment of road 
vehicle products as claimed by the application of the 
ISO 26262.  
Keywords: Automotive Architecture Description 
Language, ISO 26262, Functional Safety Analysis.  
1. Introduction 
The international standard ISO 26262 [1], published 
in November 2011, is the adaptation of the generic 
safety industry standard IEC 61508 [2] to comply 
with specific needs of the automotive industry for 
development of road vehicles of less than 3.5 tons. It 
defines the process for the overall safety lifecycle of 
electrical and/or electronic (E/E) systems and 
specifies safety-related activities to be performed 
during the development cycle. It emphasizes a 
system engineering approach with the delivery of 
process-related work products applicable on each 
engineering level such as system, hardware, 
software and on supporting processes.  
The relevant safety analysis activities start with the 
item definition during vehicle concept phase and 
progress with the evaluation of ability to mitigate or 
avoid hazards in identified operational situations. 
This evaluation allows the identification of the 
corresponding safety goals with a classified 
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL), in order to 
initiate the process-based requirements. 
Subsequently systematic analysis of causes and 
effects of the system malfunctions shall be initiated 
on preliminary safety analysis. During system 
development, safety measures have to be defined to 
control, reduce or avoid effects of the malfunctions of 
the system components. Faults inside components 
can be random hardware faults or systematic faults. 
The analysis of causes and effects of these faults 
has to be performed in order to evaluate if they can 
violate a safety goal. Technical safety mechanisms 
shall be specified to detect and control the 
components faults and mitigate their effects to 
prevent a system malfunction. Clause 7.4.3 of ISO 
26262, Part 4 “Product development at the system 
level” [1], requires deductive and inductive methods 
to perform safety analyses. These analyses have to 
be completed down to the level of hardware and 
software components as claimed in Part 5, Clause 
7.4.3 and Part 6, Clause 7.4.13, respectively for 
“product development” at “hardware” and “software 
level” [1]. Moreover, Part 5 demands evaluation of 
the hardware architectural metrics and of the safety 
goal violation due to random hardware failures. 
In actual automotive engineering practice, the safety 
evaluation of the system architecture is performed 
lately in the product development. Additionally, due 
to the increased product complexity and the large 
amount of components, there is a high risk of 
inconsistency between the safety analysis and the 
designed product. This error-proneness is increased 
by the use of different tools for engineering design 
and safety/reliability analysis. 
Therefore, there is a strong need for novel 
methodologies to facilitate safety design and safety 
verification activities in an iterative and safety-aware 
process. These methodologies shall close the gap 
between the definition of the architecture elements 
and their associated malfunctions with their failure 
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propagations over the architecture. This eases the 
definition and the evaluation of the impact of safety 
mechanisms integration. The required quantification 
of the hardware metrics, Clause 8 and 9 of ISO 
26262 Part 5 [1], shall be aided by methodology 
through organizing the failure rate of the set of 
hardware electronic parts to facilitate safety 
hardware architecture upgrade. 
From software side, recently, the automotive industry 
adopted the AUTOSAR [3] standardized architecture 
supported by model based technology for describing 
software component implementation and integration, 
and the ECU resource configuration. Release 4.0 
has been delivered in late 2012, containing already a 
well-defined set of safety mechanisms responsible 
for error detection (e.g. watchdog manager) and 
error handling (e.g. diagnostics or error reporting to 
the application layer). Moreover, the architecture 
description language EAST-ADL [4] designed to 
support the vehicle architecture and the control of 
engineering artifacts (such as requirement, variant 
management control, etc...) has been harmonized 
with the AUTOSAR architecture and initiated the 
direction for supporting safety analyses in the EAST-
ADL version 2.1 [4]. 
Thanks to the use of model based techniques, we 
propose to extend and complement these state of 
the art architecture languages, to define new 
methodologies able to support, accelerate and pre-
assess safety analyses complying with ISO 26262 
qualitative and quantitative assessments from the 
architecture level down to the level of the hardware 
and software implementation. 
Our paper is structured as following. Section 2 
introduces the state of the art of model based safety 
analysis that has been considered during this work.  
In section 3 the concept of error modeling and fault 
propagation to be able to perform safety analyses on 
automotive products is presented. Section 4 
describes the proposed continuous methodology for 
safety evaluation across different abstracted 
representations of automotive products in 
compliance with the ISO 26262 process. Section 5 
illustrates the use of the methodology in the context 
of the hardware architecture supported by a concrete 
example. Section 6 explains the context for 
appliance of safety analysis for an AUTOSAR 
software platform. Section 7 illustrates a case study 
and depicts a short overview of a tool prototype 
implementation for this methodology. Finally, 
conclusions draw the consideration of the designers' 
as end-users’ perspectives, and the description of 
future work in Section 8. 
2. Related Work 
State of the art methods and tools for model based 
safety analysis have been introduced and are 
current practice in aeronautics industry. The actual 
civil avionics recommendation standard for safety 
assessment ARP4754 [5] and the associated 
methods in ARP4761 [6] toward model techniques 
have been largely investigated during this decades. 
In particular during the ESACS project [7] the use of 
AltaRica [8] formal language was evaluated, lessons 
learnt based on Airbus aircraft safety analysis 
capitalized [11], and the benefit for the application of 
the ARP standards demonstrated. On the top of 
practice for E/E architecture assessment, another 
usage of AltaRica was proposed in [12] targeting 
multi-physicals systems. Nevertheless, most of these 
successful model based analyses only consider 
system at equipment level, where the equipment 
fulfills only a single functionality. Therefore these 
proposed methods are difficult to apply at software 
or hardware implementation level due to 
combinatory explosion of basic technology. 
Another approach was proposed in the context of the 
ASSERT project [13], by automatic building of 
dependability-oriented analytical models from high 
level AADL [14] architecture models. Thanks to 
AADL error model, Markov analysis can be 
performed and fault trees can be generated and 
analyzed [15]. Advanced experiments were 
performed on Integrated Modular Avionic (IMA) 
architecture, having similar software architecture 
than AUTOSAR. The complexity of automotive ECU 
integrating tremendous electronics parts with large 
diversity (e.g. microprocessors or ASIC’s) cannot be 
standardized as for IMA approach by high level 
modeling.  
Related to the automotive research project 
ATESST2, the EAST-ADL [4] architecture language 
description was extended to support safety analyses 
thanks to the connection of failure synthesizer HiP-
HOPS [17]. The proposed methodology allows 
performing cut set fault tree analysis (FTA) and 
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) from 
analysis of the automated generation of faults. 
Meanwhile, such proposal for analysis is mainly 
functional oriented to support system modeling. But 
it does support neither software implementation 
analysis nor hardware metrics calculation. 
Focusing on hardware evaluation, the work of Jeon 
et al. [18] describes the process of performing 
hardware architectural metrics. However, there is 
neither a semi-formal or formal method nor a 
prototype implementation available. Additionally, the 
proposed methodology discussed by K. Svancara 
[19] for residual risk evaluation of the violation of a 
safety goal using Failure Rate Class method 
(alternative method proposed by ISO 26262 instead 
of using PMHF) brings strong benefit to ISO 26262. 
Integration in model based environments would 
support automation of the analyses. 
In the article of [20], a model-based methodology for 
the implementation of hardware assessment based 
on detailed hardware level according to ISO 26262 is 
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proposed. It shall be extended to permit hardware 
metrics evaluation at the architecture level. 
The current work of the European project ‘Safe 
Automotive soFtware architecture’ (SAFE) [21] 
organized in the framework of ITEA2, aims to 
overcomes these gaps applying model-based 
approach for automotive safety-related systems. 
3. SAFE Error Modeling Concept  
The selected modeling languages for SAFE are 
EAST-ADL and AUTOSAR. Relationship between 
these two domain models have been largely 
discussed and documented in the ATESST project 
during the elaboration of the EAST-ADL language.  
For the description of the automotive system 
architecture on different abstraction levels, 
AUTOSAR represents the implementation layer for 
software and additionally has to be improved to 
sketch hardware implementation. EAST-ADL has to 
be enhanced to represent separate but interrelated 
architecture views of hardware and software 
component.  
Regarding error modeling, the proposed approach 
extends the structural architecture elements on each 
abstraction level, by a straight forward relation. The 
related error model captures the malfunctions and 
errors relations between the elements. In details, the 
error model describes the black-box view in terms of 
error propagation for the referenced structural 
elements. Thus, the error model reports the visible 
interfaces external faults for incoming faults and 
external failures for output failure. The error model is 
also associated with white-box information as the 
error behavior of an element. In this case, the 
internal details of the structural element are known 
and the respective internal faults (e.g. random 
internal hardware faults) as well as the process 
faults (systematic faults such as design, 
implementation, installation, operation and 
overstress faults) can be described. It is possible to 
describe with semi-formal notation how malfunctions 
as external faults, internal faults and process faults 
are related with external failures. This behavior is 
defined as error behavior, as depicted in Figure 1.
 
Figure 1: Error model overview 
Moreover, the integrated view of the error models 
allows connecting external failures and external 
faults using the concept of a cause-effect relation 
named fault failure propagation link. This way it is 
possible to describe how external faults can be 
caused from preceding architectural elements and 
describe a complete error propagation chain from 
the root fault(s) towards the failure of interest. In 
addition a vertical propagation error model mapping 
is introduced to handle assumption made during 
safety analysis across different abstraction levels.  
In the scope of the error behavior, the SAFE meta-
model allows to either use a selected language 
(AADL, HiP-HOPS, AltaRica or free format) or the 
simplified SAFE language for the same purpose. The 
objective was not to reinvent a complete language, 
but to build the requirements for the grammar and 
the semantics of a simplified SAFE language that 
could be transformed transparently in HiP-HOPS or 
AltaRica for the user. 
4. Safety Concept Continuous Evaluation 
The safety analyses for each safety goal are used to 
support the safety concept and the development 
design phase activities. Requirements are derived 
from safety goals and refined up to HW/SW 
requirements as reflected in the ISO 26262 Part 
organization.  
The top level malfunctions can be formally captured 
for the identified model element of the item 
decomposition as recommended in Clause 7.4.2 of 
Part 3 “Concept Phase” during the hazard and risk 
analysis phase.  
The allocation of functional safety requirements onto 
the functional architecture represented in the 
analysis level of EAST-ADL allows defining the 
scope of the initial safety analyses. The analyses are 
built on local element malfunctions, e.g. similar to 
FMEA, used to perform systematic analysis of 
causes and effects of the malfunctions of the system 
elements. The malfunctions and error behavior are 
captured in the error model and propagate through 
the complete system model, finally linked to the top 
level malfunctions. The transformation of the 
complete system error model to a failure synthesis 
tool environment e.g. AltaRica [9] [10] or HiP-HOPS 
[16], allows qualitative evaluation of the violation of 
the safety goal. The tool output shall at least exhibit 
failure cut sets and sequence failures, extracted from 
a generated fault tree. To satisfy safety 
requirements, safety measure requirements are 
introduced to mitigate or control effects of the 
malfunction of the system elements. They can then 
be traced to the structural elements, and may induce 
modification on architecture elements to mitigate the 
respective failure. According to the update of the 
error model, the safety analyses can be re-executed 
to verify the functional safety concept, as granted by 
the Clause 8.4.5 of the Part 3 “Concept Phase”. The 
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overview of the safety analysis process is 
summarized in the Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Safety analysis process overview for 
functional safety concept 
Afterwards, the first version of the technical safety 
architecture and associated error model can be 
defined. It is built from requirement refinement 
(respectively functional safety requirements (FSR) 
into technical safety requirements (TSR) and from 
safety measure requirements into concrete hardware 
or software components as safety mechanisms) as 
well as from the allocation of technical requirements 
onto hardware and software architecture elements. 
Similar to previous methodology, the qualitative 
evaluation is performed compliant to Clause 7 of the 
ISO 26262, Part 4 “System Level” and common 
cause analysis can be preliminary assessed on 
component level.  
Before starting the hardware design, the quantitative 
evaluation of hardware architectural metrics and 
residual risk targets for each safety goal conforming 
to Clause 8 and 9 of the ISO 26262, Part 5 for the 
hardware level can be performed to help refining the 
hardware safety requirements .More detailed 
information about additional modeling constructs and 
methodology is detailed in section 5. 
Finally, corresponding hardware and software 
disciplines can start implementation of hardware and 
software products. The error model and safety 
analyses can still be applied on the modeling 
elements using aggregation of error model to 
AUTOSAR modeling constructs. Failure mitigation 
and assumption can still be traced and verified 
according to the architecture thanks to the use of the 
error model mapping construct.  
5. Hardware architecture evaluation 
As introduced above, the hardware architecture 
captures the technical capability of the intended 
hardware to the achievement of functional safety. It 
is based on decision of allocation of technical safety 
requirements and safety measures requirements to 
hardware elements. To do so the, artifacts of the 
EAST-ADL hardware design architecture are used. 
The hardware architecture is represented by a net of 
logical hardware components connected by their 
electrical connections. These components can be 
simple sensors or actuators, or complex components 
composed by parts representing the functionalities 
they are embedding. The component net is the 
hardware view of the technical safety concept 
iterated during safety analysis. It shall be 
emphasized that this representation does not 
describe the electronic schematic including all the 
parts of the hardware design (e.g. resistance, 
capacitor, etc.), but it depicts blocks for hardware 
function scope definition.  
Then, failure propagation analysis is performed.  
Hardware complex component (e.g. microcontroller) 
has a strong interaction between hardware and 
software. Accurate system failure propagation can 
only be made by a mixed analysis of software and 
hardware architecture. Therefore analysis of overall 
architecture change, in particular for introduction of 
safety mechanisms, shall always consider both 
failure perspectives and theirs interactions.  
The relation between hardware and software 
architecture is defined according to the Hardware-
Software Interface (HSI) as required by Clause 7.4.6 
of ISO 26262 Part 4 “System Design”. This element 
is an abstraction of a hardware detailed element, 
e.g. memory mapping, operating mode, etc... It has a 
dual nature to allow referencing elements of the 
hardware domain to elements of the software 
domain. It describes the fault propagation between 
the two domains.  
As presented in the previous section, the ISO 26262 
claims quantitative evaluation of the hardware 
metrics according to the ASIL level. These 
evaluations require dedicated hardware constructs to 
be able to capture reliability data of the hardware 
element: component failure mode as a specialization 
of a malfunction and component failure rate. As a 
hardware component is an abstraction of a section of 
a detailed electronic schematic (i.e. a super set of 
electronics parts), reliability values are defined as 
component allocation values or reused from pre-
existing design. The calculation of the hardware 
architecture metrics, Clause 8 of ISO 26262 Part 5 
“Hardware development”, needs to identify the type 
of the fault. For the purpose of Single-Point Fault 
Metric (SPFM) and Latent-Fault Metric (LFM) 
calculation, the fault shall be tagged as single point 
fault, residual fault or latent fault. This tag 
“component fault” of an element depends on the 
context. It is defined from combination of the result of 
the qualitative analysis as the cut-set order, a 
malfunction as a leaf of a fault tree, and from the 
traceability information identifying its coverage by a 
safety mechanism. This is identified by a satisfy 
relationship from hardware component (or its sub-
part) playing the role of a safety mechanism, to a 
safety mechanism requirement.  
The diagnostic coverage (DC) for latent and residual 
faults is a property of a “safety mechanism”. Their 
values are used for final SPFM and LFM calculation. 
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They are defined as targets for the architecture for 
implementation of a safety mechanism solution 
element. The target value shall be compatible with 
the impact in hardware metrics for each safety goal, 
and be bounded by the worst case value matching 
the maximum ASIL level. They have to be verified 
from the detailed design architecture using 
electronics parts reliability data. The DC target value 
and fault qualification can then be used to derive 
hardware safety requirements assigned on selected 
parts of the electronic design. We propose a 
quantification of the failure rate of this hardware 
component by a formula built from the reliability data 
of the super set of electronic parts. The result of the 
calculation can then be re-introduced as the value 
for the failure rate of the respective hardware 
component, to verify the estimated value from the 
preliminary SPFM and LFM calculation.  
The concept of component failure rate allocation is 
also applied for the evaluation of residual risks of 
safety goal violations from Clause 9 of ISO 26262 
Part 5. Two alternatives are proposed: Failure Rate 
Class (FRC) method and “Probabilistic Metric for 
Random Hardware Failure” (PMHF). FRC method 
evaluates each hardware component individually, 
while PMHF presents a global approach using as an 
example a quantified FTA. As for architectural 
metrics, the relation to electronic parts super set and 
associated formula can be used. 
6. AUTOSAR software evaluation  
In the AUTOSAR architecture, the software is 
composed of many interconnected AUTOSAR 
software components, which are deployed on the 
microcontrollers within the ECUs. In addition, the 
microcontrollers also contain an AUTOSAR basic 
software stack which controls the Microcontroller 
Unit (MCU) hardware and provides generic services 
to the software components, like access to 
input/output channels, persistent memory or 
partitioning. The use of the error model concept 
allows creating a clear separation between the 
application layer and the application environment 
given from the AUTOSAR infrastructure (ECU-
hardware, basic software and RTE). This split 
permits to analyze the software considering the 
impact of the different malfunctions from the 
application environment. The set of malfunctions 
originated from the environment are clustered into 
computing and communication anomalies. Figure 3 
below depicts the separation of the application layer 
and the application environment for safety analysis 
purposes. 
 
Figure 3: AUTOSAR error model separation 
The failure ports of the application layer match 
exactly those of the application environment. 
Moreover, the abstraction of the infrastructure can 
be improved to reach the level of ECU partition as 
defined by the AUTOSAR specification. The ECU 
partition, (e.g. each ECU in Figure 3 could be seen as 
independent ECU partition) guarantees freedom 
from interference of software applications and allows 
to deploy application software with different ASIL 
allocation to the same ECU. 
The application environment describes the 
malfunctions induced by the execution platform incl. 
network technology. Horizontal propagation links 
express how errors propagate from one software 
component to another on the same level. Having this 
information as input, a complete AUTOSAR software 
safety qualitative evaluation can be performed using 
the same tool environment as proposed in section 4. 
7. Case study and tool prototype support 
One of the selected public case studies to exhibit 
methods and tools developed in the SAFE project is 
extracted from the ISO 26262 Part 5 Annex E. This 
initial example is re-engineered to demonstrate 
safety analysis during the engineering development 
down to the level of implementation level. This 
section explains the use of the case study to reach 
SAFE project objectives. In addition, relation to 
relevant parts of the SAFE tool environment is given.  
The SAFE tool environment is built upon the open 
source SAFE reference platform connected with 
specialized safety analysis tools like PREEvision [24] 
from Vector or SafetyDesigner from Dassault 
Systèmes [10]. The SAFE reference platform 
provides an EMF-based Java implementation of the 
SAFE meta-model and integrates the AUTOSAR 
meta-model implementation from ARTOP [22] as 
well as the EAST-ADL meta-model implementation 
from EATOP [23]. The SAFE meta-model platform 
offers a basic authoring experience, i.e., an Eclipse 
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perspective with a tree-based model explorer view 
for navigating through SAFE model files. It allows 
editing safety-related extensions for EAST-ADL and 
AUTOSAR models. This content is defined as the 
minimum content and shall facilitate platform 
extensions, in particular for development of graphical 
user interface and specialized safety analysis tool 
development.  
Safety Goals 
The case study is an automotive system that realizes 
two functions inside the same ECU. Function one is 
controlling a sensor temperature in order to open an 
external valve in case of overheating. The potential 
hazard is a vehicle catching fire. First hazard and 
risk analysis leads to the following safety goal 
classified with ASIL B criticality: “valve 2 shall not be 
closed for longer than x ms when the temperature is 
higher than 100 °C”. Function two, with the 
constraints to be integrated into the ECU with only 
one processor is controlling the vehicle speed to 
open another external valve in case of upper limit 
speed, similar to cruise control functionalities. The 
second hazard can be identified as vehicle accident 
classifying the safety goal “valve 1 shall not be 
closed for longer than y ms when the speed is higher 
than 100 km/h” with ASIL C criticality. 
Functional Safety Concept 
The initial representation of the functional 
architecture of the system uses the analysis level of 
EAST-ADL. It is used to represent the Functional 
Safety Concept thanks to EAST-ADL analysis blocks 
complemented by the SAFE error model. For 
function one (seeFigure 4), the analysis level is 
represented by a FunctionalDevice for the 
temperature sensor, a second one for the output 
valve and an AnalysisFunction for the calculation of 
the temperature controlling the valve 2 activation.  
 
Figure 4: Function one representation 
The SAFE error model references this top level 
architecture and is composed by three 
interconnected ErrorModelPrototypes (see Figure 5), 
one for each function block. Each 
ErrorModelPrototypes is typed by a respective 
ErrorModelType, which defines its 
MFPFunctionPorts in the role as external faults or 
failures. They are typed by a general 
MalfunctionType called “PError” representing the 
general error as failure propagated through the port. 
Each MFPFunctionPort is referencing the respective 
FunctionFlowPort of the selected EAST-ADL block to 
link the system model and the error model. The 
ErrorBehavior of each ErrorModelType is enriched 
by one MalfunctionPrototype in the role as internal 
fault and typed by one of the general 
MalfunctionTypes Sensor_Error, Actuator_Error or 
Function_Error. 
 
Figure 5: Corresponding Error Model 
In addition, the internal failure propagation shall be 
defined according to the SAFE expression language. 
For Temp_Calculation, the failure propagation is 
expressed as follows: “ExtFailure_TC_Out.ERROR = 
ExtFault_TC_In.ERROR OR Internal_TC-F_Error”. The 
implementation of the safety goal for function one 
corresponds to the deviation of one of the external 
failures of the top-level error model. This is shown as 
“valve2 event” in Figure 5. The deviation is 
represented by the occurrence of the malfunction 
PError on the MFPFunctionPort output. This first 
error model representation allows performing 
qualitative safety analysis on the functional safety 
concept as recommended in Figure 2 of section 4.  
The connection of fault synthesis tools to the SAFE 
reference platform is still under development. So, the 
error model was re-captured in the syntax of the fault 
synthesizer using the HiP-HOPS [16] analyzer. The 
functional architecture and SAFE error model 
element were mapped to the syntax of HiP-HOPS to 
evaluate function one. Not surprising, the results 
lead to an order one of the cut set caused by basic 
event Sensor_Error on the temperature sensor block 
or by a Function_Error on the temperature 
calculation and control block. A functional safety 
requirement is created, where the attribute Tactic 
field indicates the expected detection and mitigation 
strategy. For function one, it indicates that the 
external failures associated with the error models for 
Temperature_Sensor and Temperature_Calculation 
shall be mitigated. Thus, a new EAST-ADL analysis 
block LifeChecker is introduced, as shown in the 
complete architecture in Figure 6. The hardware 
watchdog of the example is seen as a possible 
implementation of the LifeChecker. 
 
Figure 6: Functional architecture example 
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The corresponding error model is updated with the 
objective for LifeChecker error model to mitigate the 
failures of Temperature_Sensor and 
Temperature_Calculation.  The LifeChecker detects 
the fault on its port In72 and mitigates the failure 
propagation by controlling the deactivation of the 
valve 2, as safe state, on its port Out73. The 
ErrorBehavior of the LifeChecker error model is 
created with no dependence on the incoming input 
fault (logical expression defined as “ExtFailure_LC-
F_InhValve.ERROR = Internal_LC-F_Error”. As we can 
see on the HiP-HOPS result shown in Figure 7, the 
cut set is now of order two and the mitigation of the 
LifeChecker is visible. 
 
Figure 7: Temperature Control fault tree analysis 
The same process was applied on the wheel speed 
control (as function two) leading to the introduction of 
the second sensor and the diagnosis block and for 
the integration with the LifeChecker block. 
Technical Safety Concept 
Now the technical safety concept is defined, based 
on technical safety requirements and the allocation 
of safety requirements to hardware and software.  
 
Figure 8: Hardware architecture example 
The hardware architecture is based on EAST-ADL 
HWComponentPrototypes representing hardware 
functional blocks, and integrates the electronic driver 
abstraction (as represented in Figure 8). The 
software architecture is defined using EAST-ADL 
DesignFunctionPrototypes. Figure 9 depicts the 
software architecture for function with the relation to 
hardware elements, including an exemplary 
declaration of software driver abstractions later 
integrated in the AUTOSAR Software infrastructure 
(BSW blocks Temp ADC Driver and Current ADC 
Driver). 
 
Figure 9: Design level software architecture example 
The error propagation between hardware and 
software needs to consider first via their interface 
(HSI). For this purpose, SAFE declares the 
HardwareSoftwareInterfaceElement, allowing to 
reference port interfaces between the EAST-ADL 
elements FlowPort and HWPin.  Secondly, the 
software function allocation to hardware processing 
units was declared using the Allocation element of 
EAST-ADL. Then, system error model is built and 
split into two perspectives, one for the hardware and 
one for the software. For interfacing the error model, 
each perspective declares its external faults and/or 
external failures to describe the incoming faults and 
propagating failures of the individual perspective.  
They are modeled as MFPFunctionPort for software 
and MPFHWPin for hardware and linked by a 
FaultFailurePropagationLink. This link is referencing 
the port malfunctions and the source element of this 
propagation, respectively an HSI element or an 
Allocation net. HiP-HOPS support the perspective 
concept and dedicated syntax for fault propagation 
between perspectives and the previously created 
SAFE artifacts like MFPFunctionPort or ErrorModel 
are mapped to the HiP-HOPS syntax. This modeling 
style allows synthesizing a fault tree including 
elements from software and hardware perspective. 
As for functional safety concept analysis, the 
introduction of malfunction mitigation through 
technical safety requirements and concrete 
realizations allows defining the complete technical 
safety concept.  
The SAFE reference platform was used to capture 
the architecture and error model. The HiP-HOPS file 
has been generated manually.  As we can see in the 
Figure 10 for temperature control (function one), the 
introduction of the output diagnosis (port OutFbV2) 
mitigates a bad software control (port 
HIS_Drv2_out_v2). It can also be noticed that failure 
of the output power stage hardware driver directly 
affects the control of the valve 2. 
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Figure 10: Temperature Control fault tree analysis 
Software Safety Analysis 
At implementation level, we further refine the system 
design and define the AUTOSAR software 
architecture of the mentioned functions. For function 
one (controlling the temperature), the software 
architecture consists of the software components 
shown in Figure 11. TempDiagnosis checks if the 
control of valve 2 has been operated correctly by 
comparing the expected actuator state and the input 
sensing the current actuator state. TempControl1 
implements the rule of opening the valve in case of 
overheating. SensorSWC2 and ActuatorSWC 
abstract the access to the peripherals. CDD3 
(Complex Device Driver) and ECUAbstraction4 
abstract from the low level details of ECUs hardware 
(i.e. concrete analogue sensors and output stage). 
 
Figure 11: Function one software architecture 
We model the erroneous behavior of the 
architectural elements using the SAFE meta-model. 
Initially, we describe a library of MalfunctionTypes, 
which are of interest for the system under 
consideration. In our case, we propose the types 
ComputationAnomaly and CommunicationAnomaly. 
Each type can be hierarchically decomposed. In 
case of CommunicationAnomaly, we further refine 
this type into the following primitive 
MalfunctionTypes: value_error (invalid content of the 
                                                          
1
 Realizes ASW “Temp Comparison” of Figure 9 
2
 Includes ASW “Temp Conversion” of Figure 9 
3
 Realizes BSW “Current ADC Driver” of Figure 9 
4
 Realizes BSWs “Current ADC Driver” and “Temp ADC 
Driver” of Figure 9 
associated data), timing_error (data arrives too 
late/too early), omission_error (data does not arrive) 
and commission_error (data arrives too often). 
As a next step, we describe the error model of the 
considered software. As mentioned in section 6, we 
distinguish between application layer and application 
environment. The error model for the application 
environment includes the malfunctions induced by 
the complete basic software stack and the hardware 
components of the ECU. The error model for the 
application layer includes a hierarchical description 
of the error propagation within the AUTOSAR 
software components under consideration. Figure 12 
highlights the ErrorModelType of the software 
component TempControl. The SAFE meta-model 
allows to link the model elements of the 
ErrorModelType with the architectural elements. For 
example, the external failure ExtFailure_TC_Valve2 
(see Figure 12) is associated with the respective 
data element of port TempControl.pTCValve2 
(seeFigure 11). 
 
Figure 12: ErrorModelType for TempControl 
The semantics of the external faults/failures is given 
through the respective MalfunctionType associated 
with them. For example, ExtFault_TC_SensorInput 
has the type CommunicationAnomaly as described 
above. Moreover, the external faults/failure can be 
brought into relation, describing the error 
propagation within the architectural element. 
Considering TempControl, the external Failure 
ExtFailure_TC_Valve2 occurs, if a) the sensor input 
is invalid, or b) the inhibition signal provided by the 
component TempDiagnosis is invalid or c) the 
application environment exhibits a computation error 
leading to the erroneous execution of the software 
component. This can be described via the following 
expression: 
ExtFailure_TC_Valve2.value_error = ExtFault_TC_InhSignal.value_error 
OR ExtFault_TC_SensorInput.value_error OR ExtFault_ComputationError.* 
For a complete error model of function one, the 
unintended behavior of all involved architectural 
elements must be specified and interlinked. In 
particular, the ErrorModelType for the application 
environment describes the malfunctions of the 
concrete ECU where function one is deployed to. It 
includes, amongst others, one external failure 
describing improper computation. This malfunction is 
then linked with the external fault 
ExtFault_ComputationError of the error model for 
TempControl. 
This way, a complete failure net can be established, 
which can then be used as input for safety analysis 
tools to automatically derive safety-relevant 
  Page 9/11 
conclusions like Single Point Faults leading to the 
violation of a safety goal. In the current state, no 
direct link between the SAFE tool platform and 
known safety analysis tools like Hip-Hops [16] or 
SafetyDesigner [10] is available. However, 
experimental attempts have shown that SAFE error 
models can be transformed into the respective 
representation of the mentioned tools. 
Hardware Safety Analysis 
Based on the technical safety concept in terms of 
hardware components as shown in Figure 8, the 
impact of random hardware failures has to be 
assessed according to the quantitative evaluations 
claimed by ISO 26262 Part 5. 
The determination of the classification is described 
exemplarily based on the fault tree shown in Figure 
10. Failure mode OutputF1.PowerStage.OpenCircuit 
is directly affiliated via one OR-gate to the top-level 
event Valve2.PhysicalOutV2. This represents a 
minimal cut-set of order 1. Therefore, the failure 
mode is classified as a single-point fault. Failure 
modes which are contained in the branch of 
ECU.uController.Out_V2 are affiliated with the top-
level event via at least one AND-gate. Thus, they are 
represented in a minimal cut-set of order greater 
than or equals 2 and classified as latent multiple-
point faults. 
To complement the initial safety evaluation of 
hardware architectural designs, the hardware 
component failure rates values represent 
assumptions taken from previous designs or expert 
knowledge. In later phases of development, the 
hardware architectural design is refined at the level 
of electronic schematics, exemplarily shown in Figure 
13. 
 
Figure 13: Hardware detailed design for function one 
of [1] Part 5 Annex E 
The failure rate assumptions can now be confirmed 
based on an electronic FMEA using logical 
expressions and the hardware part failure data taken 
from exemplarily recognized industry sources or 
company-specific databases [1]. This is exemplarily 
presented for the failure modes of hardware 
component Input F1. 
InputF1.SCG = C13.SC OR C23.SC 
InputF1.SCB = R23.SC 
InputF1.OC = R23.OC OR R13.OC 
To quantify the expressions, the failure rates of the 
corresponding failure modes have to be transformed 
into probabilistic values based on system lifetime, 
according to ISO 26262 Part 10 Annex B.4. 
Alternatively to the hardware architectural design, 
safety evaluation could also be performed directly at 
the level of electronic schematics [20]. 
For the quantitative evaluations according to [1], FZI 
has set up a research prototype implementation 
which provides classification of failure modes based 
on fault tree generation and analysis. Hardware 
structural and failure data for architectural and 
detailed designs can be imported using a XML-
based file format. Results of the quantitative 
evaluations are automatically verified against target 
values, which can be user-defined or taken from 
recommendation of [1].  
 
Figure 14: Excerpt of report for hardware safety 
evaluation 
All analysis results are included in corresponding 
reports as a PDF file for documentation purposes, as 
exemplarily shown in Figure 14 for the hardware 
detailed design of ISO 26262 Part 5 Annex E. The 
presented hardware safety evaluations and modeling 
of hardware designs including failure data are also 
integrated as prototype plug-ins in the model-based 
tool environment PREEvision to ease consistent 
modeling and evaluation [25][26]. 
8. Conclusion and future work 
In this paper we presented a methodology for model 
based safety analysis of automotive systems. Based 
on a case study, we demonstrated its capability to 
perform early assessment of safety concepts. The 
different evaluations comply with the ISO 26262 
“Road Vehicle - Functional Safety” and facilitate the 
design of automotive products via qualitative 
evaluation of the architecture, from functional 
abstraction down to implementation layer (e.g. 
AUTOSAR software architecture). In addition, it 
provides a proposal to control the complexity of 
electronic design to compute the quantitative 
measures required by the ISO 26262 standard. 
Input F1
Component
name
Failure rate 
/ FIT
Safety-
related
HW 
compone
nt?
Failure mode Failure rate 
distribution
Failure mode 
has potential 
to directly 
violate the 
safety goal?
Safety 
mechanis
m for 
direct 
violation
Diagnostic 
coverage 
with respect 
to residual 
faults
Residual or 
single-point 
fault failure 
rate / FIT
Failure mode 
has potential to 
violate the 
safety goal in 
combination 
with another 
fault?
Safety 
mechanism for 
violation in 
combination 
with another 
fault
Diagnostic 
coverage 
with respect 
to latent 
faults
Latent 
multiple-
point fault 
failure rate 
/ FIT
C71 2.0 YES OpenCircuit 20.0 % X none 0.0 % 0.4
C71 2.0 YES ShortCircuit 80.0 %
R13 2.0 YES OpenCircuit 90.0 % X none 0.0 % 1.8
R13 2.0 YES ShortCircuit 10.0 % X none 0.0 % 0.2
…
Single-Point Fault Metric:
Sum of Single-Point and Residual Faults: 9.65 FIT
Single-Point Fault Metric: 93.20 %
Single-Point Fault Metric Target ASIL Reached? Status: fulfilled
6. Results for the hardware architectural metrics
Calculation of the hardware architectural metrics: single-point fault metric and latent-fault metric for each specific safety goal. 
6.1 SafetyGoal1
Hardware Architectural Metrics
Report for Hardware Safety Evaluation
Project: FZI_HWSafetyEvaluation_V0.1.eea
Date: 26.11.2013
Total Failure Rate: 163.0 FIT
Total Safety Related: 142.0 FIT
Latent-Fault Metric:
Sum of Latent Multiple-Point Faults: 13.25 FIT
Latent-Fault Metric: 89.99 %
Latent-Fault Metric Target ASIL Status? Status: fullfilled
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The automotive domain, quite conservative for 
methods but subject to competitive market, requires 
a fully integrated environment to ease modeling and 
to abstract the complexity of safety analysis 
constructs. Despite actual maturity of specialized 
analyzer, this is still a challenge. In particular, 
today’s tools only partly support the automotive 
design engineer adequately in its activity to conduct 
multi domain safety analysis with short iteration 
loops. 
The complete safety assessment of AUTOSAR 
infrastructure including hardware architecture, in 
particular the relation between middleware and 
related hardware element is still under investigation. 
This is part of future work. 
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11. Glossary 
SCB Short Circuit to Battery 
SCG Short Circuit to Ground 
DC         Diagnostic Coverage 
HSI Hardware Software Interface 
IMA Integrated Model Avionic 
ECU Electronic Control Unit  
E/E  Electrical/Electronic 
FRC Failure Rate Class 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
LFM       Latent Fault Metric 
MBD: Model Based Development  
MPFL Multiple Point Fault Latent 
OC Open Circuit 
PMHF  Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware Failure 
RTE Run Time Environment 
SC Short Circuit  
SPF Single-Point Fault 
SPFM    Signe-Point Fault Metric 
